X. Education Law by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 2 Article 15
Spring 3-1-1980
X. Education Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Education Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
X. Education Law, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 594 (1980), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/
wlulr/vol37/iss2/15
594 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
evidence.59 Decisions at variance with the Massiah-Brewer-Henry line of
cases are explained by the absence of governmental intent to violate the
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel 0
Henry v. United States reaches the correct result in affording sixth
amendment right to counsel protection for a criminal defendant against
whom incriminating evidence was gathered through post-indictment con-
versations with a government informant."1 Without any knowledge that he
was being interrogated, 2 the defendant Henry was unable to invoke his
right to counsel during the government's intentional plan to elicit informa-
tion from him absent cbunsel.63 Although the Fourth Circuit's analysis is
somewhat attenuated in reaching its result within an interrogation frame-
work, 4 Henry rests soundly upon the necessary judicial protection against
governmental intent to violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel. 5 Brewer and interrogation in the post-indictment context await
further Supreme Court clarification. Ultimately, the government's intent
to obtain incriminating statements in the absence of counsel justifies
Henry as a logical successor to Brewer and Massiah.
PHILIP DoMINIc CALDERONE
X. EDUCATION LAW
Financial Exigency and Academic Tenure
Academic tenure is a status granted to a teacher after a probationary
period of employment.' Tenure is designed to protect academic freedom
" See text accompanying notes 8, 13 & 21 supra.
o See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1348 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1000 (1978)(where electronic monitoring was result of usual prison policy regarding
highly publicized cases and those involving high security risks, defendant's statements so
obtained were admissible); United States v. Garcia, 377 F.2d 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1967)(defen-
dant's voluntary statement held admissible where agent was unaware of indictment and was
seeking no incriminating information); Stowers v. United States, 351 F.2d 301, 302 (9th Cir.
1965) (where defendant was not employed by government, his voluntary testimony concerning
defendant's post-indictment jailhouse statements held admissible); United States v. Accardi,
342 F.2d 697, 701 (2d Cir. 1965)(where known government agent's only purpose was to serve
subpoena on another person, defendant's voluntary post-indictment statements absent coun-
sel held admissible).
" See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
12 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
11 See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
6 See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
See Collins v. Parsons College, - Iowa -, -, 203 N.W.2d 594, 597 (1973). See gener-
ally C. BYSE & L. JOUGHLIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: PLANS, PRACTICES AND
THE LAW (1959) [hereinafter cited as BYSE & JOUGHLIN]; B. SHAW, ACADEMIC TENURE IN
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1971); Van Alystyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation and
"Defense," 57 AAUP BULL. 328 (1971). See also Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractual and
Constitutional Context, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 279, 280 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tenure Rights].
Typically, tenure is granted to a faculty member after teaching three to seven years at a
particular college or university. BYSE & JOUGHLIN, supra at 9-10. The criteria used to confer
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
and to attract competent personnel by ensuring that the tenured
individual will not be dismissed without cause.2 Although tenure at state
funded schools may be controlled by statute,3 tenure at state and private
institutions typically is defined in terms of a contractual relationship
between the tenured professor and the academic institution.4 Until
recently, disputes over the rights of tenure have been resolved primarily
by resort to the internal grievance procedures of the particular college or
tenure include teaching skills, research, publication, and service to the college or university.
Id. at 28-34. Academic tenure plans exist at all public and private universities and at ninety-
four percent of the nation's private colleges. COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1973). In a study of ten-
ure plans at eighty colleges and universities, fourteen of those institutions did not formally
document the provisions of their tenure systems. BYSE & JOUGHLIN, supra at 77 n.10. The
lack of a documented tenure plan may result from a belief that custom and tradition in
academic institutions are preferable to written rules and regulations. Id. at 135.
See Drans v. Providence College, - R.I. -, -, 383 A.2d 1033, 1039 (1978); Tenure
Rights, supra note 1, at 279-82. Tenure is designed to foster society's interest in research
and learning by eliminating the threat of a teacher's discretionary dismissal. Browzin v.
Catholic Univ. of Amer., 527 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1975), citing Academic Freedom and
Tenure: 1940 Statement of Principles, 60 AAUP BULL. 269 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1940
Statement]. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, promul-
gated by the American Association of Colleges, reflects widely accepted standards of con-
duct in the national academic community. See Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Amer., 527 F.2d
at 847 n.8; Furniss, The Status of "AAUP Policy", 1978 EDUC. REC. 7, 19, 22 [hereinafter
cited as The Status of AAUP Policy]; 1940 Statement, supra at 269; Note, Financial Exi-
gency as Cause For Termination of Tenured Faculty Members in Private Post Secondary
Educational Institutions, 62 IOWA L. REv. 481, 504, 509 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Finan-
cial Exigency]. The 1940 Statement often is incorporated by reference into the employment
agreements at educational institutions. Finkin, Toward a Law of Academic Status, 22 BUFF.
L. REV. 575, 597 n.84, 597-98 (1973); see, e.g., Holliman v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D.
Va. 1971). The 1940 Statement provides that the employment of a tenured faculty member
may be terminated upon retirement, upon a showing of "cause," or upon an institution's
strained financial condition that necessitates reduction of faculty size. See AAUP v. Bloom-
field College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 264, 322 A.2d 846, 854-55 (Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd in part,
136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615 (App. Div. 1975); 1940 Statement, supra at 270. See also
note 10 infra. The 1940 Statement provides a procedure for termination of tenure for cause
and requires that termination of tenure for reason of financial exigency be "demonstrably
bona fide." 1940 Statement, supra at 270. See also note 44 infra.
3 See Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 231 (W.D. Wis. 1974), afl'd, 510
F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975). The Johnson court decided the claims of state university faculty
members who derived tenured status directly from a state statute. Id.; Wis. STAT. ANN. §
37.31 (West) (repealed 1973). Most state university tenure systems, however, are established
by the institution's governing board. See Note, The Dismissal of Tenured Faculty for Rea-
sons of Financial Exigency, 51 IND. L. J. 417, 419 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Dismissal of
Tenured Faculty].
4 See Financial Exigency, supra note 2, at 509 n.166; see, e.g., Rose v. Elmhurst Col-
lege, 62 Ill. App. 3d 824, 826, 379 N.E.2d 791, 792 (1978) (private); Brady v. Board of Trust-
ees of Neb. State College, 196 Neb. 226, -, 242 N.W.2d 616, 618 (1976); Hillis v. Meister, 82
N.M. 474, -, 483 P.2d 1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1971) (state); Fazekas v. University of Hous-
ton, 565 S.W.2d 299, 304-07 (Ct. App. Tex. 1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 952 (1979)
(state). Although most state supported colleges and universities enter into an employment
contract with teachers, these contracts may be subject to unilateral modification by the
state on the theory that they incorporate a statutory-based reservation of the power to
change institutional rules. See Fazekas v. University of Houston, 565 S.W.2d at 304-07. See
also note 31 infra.
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university.5 Since the early 1970's, however, there has been a significant
increase in litigation on the issue of whether a tenured teacher may be
dismissed due to the precarious financial condition of an institution.6
While tenure disputes generally are resolved by reference to the specific
contract or statute which created the employment relationship,7 courts
may also rely on national custom and practice to supplement an
employment contract." In Krotkoff v. Goucher College,9 the Fourth
See Tenure Rights, supra note 1, at 279-80.
8 Id. at 279. The expansion of college and university faculties to meet the massive stu-
dent enrollments of the 1960's has been reversed by a declining student population in the
1970's. See New York Inst. of Tech. v. State Div. of Hum. Rights, 40 N.Y.2d 316, 323, 353
N.E.2d 598, 603 (1976). Continuing inflation and the reduction in student enrollments have
resulted in operating deficits that have necessitated terminating the employment of many
tenured faculty members. See M. Mix, TENURE AND TERMINATION IN FINANCIAL EXIGENCY 1
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Mix]. See generally Tucker, Financial Exigency-Rights, Re-
sponsibilities, and Recent Decisions, 2 J.C. & UNIV. L. 103, 103 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Tucker]; Note, Economically Necessitated Faculty Dismissals as a Limitation on Academic
Freedom, 52 DENVER L.J. 911, 913 (1975); Dismissal of Tenured Faculty, supra note 3, at
419. See also Wilson, Financial Exigency: Examination of Recent Cases Involving Layoff of
Tenured Faculty, 6 J.C. & UNIV. L. 187, 187 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Recent Cases In-
volving Financial Exigency]; Financial Exigency, supra note 2, at 482.
See, e.g., Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 199 Neb. 618, -, 260 N.W.2d 595, 595 (1977);
Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, -, 483 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Ct. App. 1971); Fazekas v. University
of Houston, 565 S.W.2d 299, 307 (Ct. App. Tex. 1978). Interpretation of employment con-
tracts at state supported schools also may involve reference to the state constitution and the
enabling statute which authorized the agreement. See Tenure Rights, supra note 1, at 291-
92. See also note 3 supra.
Besides remedies for breach of contract, faculty members at state supported colleges
and universities have constitutional protection under the fourteenth amendment. Tenure
Rights, supra note 1, at 297; see Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 574 (1968)
(school violated first amendment); Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers' Speech: The Af-
termath of Pickering, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1256, 1257 (1974). See generally Van Alstyne, The
Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841. A state university
teacher's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment require that a state must pro-
vide a hearing if a dismissed teacher is deprived of a property right such as tenure. See
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600 (1972). See generally Note, The Effect of Tenure on
Public School Teachers' Substantive Constitutional and Procedural Due Process Rights, 38
Mo. L. REv. 279 (1973). The constitution, however, may regulate a private university or
college if that institution engages in sufficient "state action" under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Tenure Rights, supra note 1, at 297; see, e.g., Buckton v. National Collegiate Athl.
Ass'n., 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1156-57 (D. Mass. 1973). See generally Lewis, The Meaning of
State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1083-86 (1960); O'Neil, Private Universities and
Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155, 155 (1970); Schubert, State Action and the Private
University, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 323, 323 (1970); Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1056 (1968). Whether a nominally private institution is
actually an instrumentality of the state, and thus subject to the fourteenth amendment,
depends in part on the amount of state governmental aid received and the extent to which
the institution acts in the public interest. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 927 (1975); see Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp.,
323 F.2d 959, 963, 970 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
' See, e.g., Karlen v. New York Univ., 464 F. Supp. 704, 706-07 (S.D. N.Y. 1979); Rose
v. Elmhurst College, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 827 n.2, 379 N.E.2d at 794 n.2; Drans v. Providence
College, - R.I. -, -, 383 A.2d 1033, 1038 (1978). In Drans, the court referred to custom and
usage in the national academic community while deciding that a college could legally set a
mandatory retirement age that would bind faculty members who were granted tenure before
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Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether the employment of a
tenured teacher could be terminated due to the financial exigency ° of the
employer institution.11 The Goucher decision is significant because the
dismissed teacher's tenure agreement did not expressly condition her
employment on the financial stability of the college.
12
Goucher, a private college for women in Towson, Maryland,
experienced severe financial problems in the late 1960's.1s Pursuant to a
program of fiscal retrenchment, the Goucher Board of Trustees dismissed
Krotkoff and three other tenured faculty members on the basis of
projected student enrollment and necessary curriculum changes.
14
Although dismissal of another teacher, Ehrlich, who had less seniority
the retirement provision was established. - R.I. at -, 383 A.2d at 1038-39. In addition to
referring to national custom, courts frequently consider the custom and practice of a partic-
ular college or university while deciding employment disputes. See Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 600 (1972); Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135-35 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Bruno v. Detroit Inst. of Tech., 36 Mich. App. 61, 64, 193 N.W.2d 322, 324 (1974); Hillis v.
Meister, 82 N.M. 484, 483 P.2d 1314, 1316 (1971). See generally Bakken, Campus Common
Law, 5 J. LAW & ED. 201 (1976). In Sindermann, the Supreme Court found that the express
contractual provisions of a college's employment contract could be supplemented by a par-
ticular university's unwritten "common law" of customary practices. 408 U.S. at 603. In
Greene, the court held that policy statements contained in the faculty handbook, through
custom and usage, became part of a teacher's employment contract notwithstanding a dis-
claimer in the handbook that stated its provisions were not binding on the university. 412
F.2d at 1134-35.
9 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978).
10 "Financial exigency" has been defined as a state of financial urgency that threatens
the continued existence of the college or university. See AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136
N.J. Super. at 446, 346 A.2d at 617. One court has held that dismissals of tenured faculty
members may be due to financial exigency on a departmental level, rather than because the
university as a whole is experiencing a financial crisis. Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 199 Neb.
618, -, 260 N.W.2d 595, 600-01 (1977). The existence of a state of financial exigency is
determined by a school's continued operating deficits but is not predicated on impending
bankruptcy or exhaustion of endowment funds. See id. at -, 260 N.W.2d at 601; Dismissal
of Tenured Faculty, supra note 3, at 423. See also note 44 infra. Although the 1940 State-
ment does not define financial exigency, a recent pronouncement of the AAUP, the 1976
Recommended Institutional Regulations Concerning Termination of Faculty Appointments
Because'of Financial Exigency, provides that financial exigency must be demonstrably bona
fide and must be "an imminent financial crisis which threatens the survival of the- institu-
tion as a whole and which can not be alleviated by less drastic means." Termination of
Faculty Appointments Because of Financial Exigency, Discontinuance of a Program or
Department, or Medical Reasons, 62 AAUP BULL. 17, 17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976
RIR]; see Financial Exigency, supra note 2, at 504-06. One court has rejected the 1976
Recommended Institutional Regulations as dispositive of the interpretation of a tenure con-
tract by reasoning that this regulation was adopted after the contract was formed. 199 Neb.
at _, 260 N.W.2d at 600.
" 585 F.2d at 678.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 677.
14 Id. Subsequent to Goucher's decision to terminate the four tenured professors, the
faculty elected a committee which reviewed the administration's proposals and ultimately
persuaded the college to retain a position for which two of the four professors, Krotkoff and
Ehrlich, were eligible. Id. at 678. The college decided to retain Ehrlich, rather than
Krotkoff, because Ehrlich had more experience in the particular course to be taught and
because she was qualified to teach another subject. Id. Krotkoff appealed this decision to
the faculty grievance committee which recommended her retention but did not suggest the
dismissal of Ehrlich. Id.
1980]
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than Krotkoff, was an alternative to appellant's dismissal, the college
decided that Ehrlich enjoyed more versatile skills and thus Krotkoff's
employment at Goucher was terminated.15  Following appellant's
dismissal, Goucher provided her with a list of all unfilled teaching
positions at the college.1" Since the only position suitable to Krotkoff
would have required the college to finance two years of training in
another discipline,17 Goucher terminated Krotkoff's appointment one
year after giving notification."8
Krotkoff subsequently sued Goucher in federal district court for
breach of her employment contract which was evidenced by the college's
by-laws and a letter granting her "indeterminate tenure."'19 Krotkoff
conceded that the college officials did not act in bad faith when they
selected her for dismissal. Nevertheless, she argued that Goucher could
not terminate a tenured position because of the school's financial
troubles.20 Since Krotkoff's employment contract for tenure did not
expressly provide for dismissal due to the college's financial distress,2' the
primary issue at trial was whether Goucher could prove that a financial
exigency provision should be read into the tenure agreement. 2 The trial
court instructed the jury that the college had the burden of proving that
the trustees reasonably believed that a financial crisis existed at Goucher,
that the college used uniform standards in selecting Krotkoff for
dismissal, and that the college made reasonable efforts to find alternate
employment for Krotkoff at Goucher. s The jury found damages of
$180,000 for Krotkoff, but the district judge entered a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, ruling that the evidence did not support the
15 Id.
16 Id.
" See id. Krotkoff, who was a German teacher, expressed an interest in filling a va-
cancy in the school's economics department. Id.
18 Id.
9 Id. at 678. In 1967, Goucher sent Krotkoff a letter granting her tenure, which the
college's by-laws defined to mean the right to continued service until retirement age was
reached or unless cause or serious disability was proven. Id. In deciding disputes over tenure
agreements, courts typically examine the institution's by-laws as evidence of the faculty
member's employment contract. See, e.g., Brady v. Board of Trustees, 196 Neb. 226, -, 242
N.W.2d 616, 618 (1976); Bellak v. Franconia College, 118 N.H. 313, -, 386 A.2d 1266, 1267
(1978).
20 585 F.2d at 676, 681. Krotkoff also alleged that Goucher violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976), by depriving her of her property rights to tenured employment and her due process
right to a fair hearing as protected by the fourteenth amendment. Complaint, Krotkoff v.
Goucher College, Civil No. W76-877 (filed June 10, 1976). The trial judge rejected this claim
without opinion on a motion for summary judgment. Order, Krotkoff v. Goucher College,
Civil No. W76-877 (D. Md., Dec. 17, 1976) (granting summary judgment).
" See 585 F.2d at 678; note 19 supra.
22 585 F.2d at 678. At trial, Krotkoff and three other dismissed faculty members testi-
fied that they understood tenure at Goucher to preclude dismissal due to the school's
financial distress. Id. at 680. Four faculty members who were not dismissed testified to a
contrary understanding. Id. Additional testimony indicated that the national academic com-
munity commonly understood that tenure allowed dismissal due to an institution's financial
exigency. Id.
23 Id. at 677.
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jury's decision.24
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that appellant's tenure contract
implicitly allowed for dismissal should the college experience severe
financial difficulties.25 The Goucher court could have construed Krotkoff's
tenure contract to require that she was absolutely entitled to continued
employment at Goucher until retirement age, unless cause or serious
disability was shown.28 The court instead decided that the tenure
contract incorporated the common understanding of the national
academic community that a grant of tenure does not preclude dismissal
due to a college's financial distress.2 7 The court relied on a widely adopted
guide to institutional policy promulgated by the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP). In 1940, the AAUP issued the Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which provides that a
tenured faculty member may be dismissed due to a college's financial
instability.2 The Fourth Circuit thus construed Krotkoff's contract as
including the nationally recognized financial exigency provision because
Krotkoff introduced no evidence that the Goucher community considered
tenure in a different manner than the national academic community.29
The Goucher court departed from the usual method of recognizing the
existence of a financial exigency provision in a tenure contract. Earlier
cases involving financial exigency dismissals have found a contract
provision for dismissal due to financial problems of the employer
institution in the express rules and regulations of the particular
institution."0 Goucher is the first case to hold, in the absence of an
express contractual provision, that the status of tenure does not prevent
the dismissal of faculty members due to an institution's financial
24 Id.
25 Id. at 680.
26 See note 19 supra; see, e.g., Collins v. Parsons College, - Iowa .. 203 N.W.2d 594,
597-98 (1973); Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, No. 2-57568 (Iowa Ct. App., filed Apr. 14,
1977); Bruno v. Detroit Inst. of Tech., 36 Mich. App. 61, 64, 193 N.W.2d 322, 324 (1971).
The Collins court, refusing to examine the general meaning of tenure, ruled that the specific
provisions of the by-laws must control an employment contract for tenure. - Iowa at -, 203
N.W.2d at 597-98. In Bruno, the court interpreted an employment contract by construing
the contract most strongly against the preparer. 36 Mich. App. at 64, 193 N.W.2d at 324.
But see Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980, 984-86 (8th Cir. 1974). In Cusumano, the
court interpreting an employment contract found the terms of the 1940 Statement to be
merely precatory, notwithstanding that the 1940 Statement was expressly incorporated by
reference into the employment relationship. Id.
27 585 F.2d at 680.
28 Id. at 679; see notes 2 & 10 supra.
29 585 F.2d at 680. The testimony of Krotkoff and the three other dismissed faculty
members, see note 22 supra, may be considered insufficient evidence for the purpose of
establishing the meaning of their tenure contracts because traditional contract doctrine re-
jects subjective intentions in favor ofattaching a reasonable construction to the party's ac-
tions. See Fairway Center Corp. v. U.I.P. Corp., 502 F.2d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir. 1974);
CALAMARI & PERILLO, CoNTRAcTs 23 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CALAMARI &
PERILLO].
30 See Browzin v. Catholic University, 527 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (parties stipu-
lated to financial exigency provision); Rose v. Elmhurst College, 62 Ill. App. 3d 824, 826, 379
N.E.2d 791, 792 (1978); Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, No. 2-57568, slip op. at 2 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1977); Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 199 Neb. 618, -, 260 N.W.2d 595, 596-
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instability.3' Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's decision is consistent with
the purpose of tenure which is not to guarantee employment during times
of economic stress, but rather to prevent arbitrary or retaliatory
dismissals.32
The Fourth Circuit's decision to follow national custom instead of
strictly adhering to the provisions of the Goucher by-laws reflects the
court's apparent belief that the economic viability of private educational
institutions must be maintained.3 While courts must often construe
agreements that do not provide for unforeseen situations,34 the imposition
of an implied term is not inevitable when a contract is silent on a
particular issue.35 Rather, the use of an implied term is often a policy
decision designed to promote public welfar. 3 s The Goucher decision
97 (1977) (stipulated); B-ellak v. Franconia College, 118 N.H. 313, -, 386 A.2d 1266, 1267
(1978); AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. at 253, 322 A.2d at 848 (Ch. Div. 1974).
s" See 585 F.2d at 679. In Goucher, the Fourth Circuit relied on two cases involving the
dismissal of tenured faculty from state supported institutions as authority for allowing col-
leges the right to terminate tenured employment for financial reasons. See id.; Johnson v.
Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 234-35 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Levitt v. Board of Trustees,
376 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (D. Neb. 1974). Although Johnson and Levitt lend support to the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion that tenure is generally understood not to preclude dismissal
due to an institution's financial troubles, they are not dispositive of the Goucher issue as
neither case determined that their respective plaintiffs enjoyed enforceable tenure rights.
See 377 F. Supp. at 952; 376 F. Supp. at 945. Only if Johnson and Levitt had found enforce-
able tenure interests based upon a contract or statute could these decisions be instructive to
the Goucher court as an interpretation of Krotkoff's tenured status. See Mix, supra note 6,
at 5-6. In Johnson, the court rejected the plaintiffs' procedural due process claims that they
were dismissed without a hearing, noting that the Wisconsin state courts probably would
uphold the state's right to dismiss tenured faculty members notwithstanding a statute which
specifically provided for their permanent employment. 377 F. Supl. at 234; see note 3
supra. A comparison of Krotkoff's contract rights to the statutory rights of the Johnson
plaintiff may be misleading because a state is free to abolish the legislatively created status
of a state university faculty member. See Phelps v. Board of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 321 (1937)
(no intent of state to create contractual status); Malone v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 213, -, 197 A.
344, 345 (1938). But see Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100-04 (1938) (statutory intent to
create contractual status). In Levitt, the court rejected the complaints of discharged faculty
members that the college had unconstitutionally deprived them of their right to continued
employment as guaranteed by the college by-laws. 376 F. Supp. at 952. The Levitt opinion
also is inapposite to Goucher because the Nebraska district court did not rule on the inter-
pretation of plaintiffs' tenure rights, but rather decided whether the termination procedure
complied with due process. See id. at 949-52; Recent Cases Involving Financial Exigency,
supra note 6, at 189.
32 See Browzin v. Catholic Univ., 527 F.2d at 846; note 2 supra.
33 See Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 199 Neb. 618, -, 260 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1977). In
Creighton, the court decided the issue of whether financial exigency existed at Creighton. In
particular, the court took judicial notice of the financial plight that many private universi-
ties were facing, explaining that "[t]he rapidly changing needs of students and society de-
mand that university administrators have sufficient discretion to retrench in areas when
faced with financial problems." Id. at -, 260 N.W.2d at 601.
See Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omissions in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. Rv. 860, 860-
61 (1968); see, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 148 (2nd Cir. 1941).
11 See note 34 supra.
38 See Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 741 (1919);
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). Recognition of an implied
term or condition by means of contract construction is the method by which courts import
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accomplishes the desirable result of allowing a private educational
institution to shift resources in times of financial stress.3 7 Unless a private
college is able to maintain a curriculum attractive to changing student
demands, the college may suffer declining enrollments that could
eventually bankrupt the institution."
In combination with considerations of public policy, the informal
nature of Krotkoff's contract facilitated the Goucher court's ability to
imply a financial exigency provision. While the hallmark of a commercial
contract is a bargained-for exchange of mutual promises,39 most. academic
tenure contracts are not the result of a detailed negotiations process in
which the expectations of the parties are clearly defined.40 Thus, the
readiness of the Goucher court to imply a financial exigency provision
seems a function of the absence of a thoroughly negotiated contract and
the desirability of the continued existence of private colleges.41 Perhaps
in recognition of the judicial license to supplement the provisions of an
incompletely documented tenure contract, faculties in higher education
are increasingly participating in collective bargaining.
42
desirable public policy into individual relationships. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note
29, at 388; see, e.g., Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075, 1080 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)(warranty of habitability implied in lease contracts).
37 See Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 199 Neb. at -, 260 N.W.2d at 601; note 33 supra.
- See AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. at 446 n.1, 346 A.2d at 617 n.1.
Bloomfield College filed a petition for reorganization in federal bankruptcy court after the
trial court's decision to reinstate thirteen former faculty members who had been dismissed
because of the college's financial exigency. Id.
39 See Higgins v. Monroe Evening News, 404 Mich. 1, 20, 272 N.W.2d 537, 543 (1978).
Due to the frequency of disputes over employment contracts for "continued" or "perma-
nent" employment in commercial settings, courts often resolve the enforceability of an em-
ployment contract by determining whether consideration was mutually bargained-for and
exchanged. See CALAMARI & PERMLO, supra note 29, at 48-49; see, e.g., Laird v. Eagle Iron
Works, - Iowa -, -, 249 N.W.2d 646, 647 (1977). As a tenured professor typically does not
promise continued employment, a college or university being sued may attack the enforce-
ability of a tenure contract on the grounds of lack of consideration. See Collins v. Parsons
College, - Iowa at _ 203 N.W.2d at 598. The custom in higher education, however, is to
grant permanent tenure and courts therefore will likely reject the defense of lack of consid-
eration. See Collins v. Parsons College, - Iowa at -, 203 N.W.2d at 597-99; Tenure Rights,
supra note 1, at 288-91; Financial Exigency, supra note 2, at 498-502. In Collins, the court
rejected the contention that an employment contract for tenure was unenforceable for lack
of consideration where a professor had given up a tenured position at another school to
teach at Parsons College. - Iowa at -, 203 N.W.2d at 599. See generally Henderson, Prom-
issory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343,(1969). See also
Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1134 & n.8, 1135; Tenure Rights, supra note 1, at
290-91.
40 See Moskow, The Scope of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L.
REv. 33, 41 & n.4. A common practice at colleges is to inform the faculty member of an offer
of tenure by letter, which the person may sign and return to the administration to signify
acceptance. Id.; see, e.g., 585 F.2d at 678; Rose v. Elmhurst College, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 824,
379 N.E.2d at 792. But see Collins v. Parsons College, - Iowa at -, 203 N.W.2d at 597 (face-
to-face, bargained-for negotiations for tenure).
41 See text accompanying notes 33 & 40 supra.
42 See McHugh, Collective Bargaining with Professionals in Higher Education:
Problems in Unit Determination, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 55, 55. See generally Wollett, The
States and Trends of Collective Negotiations for Faculty in Higher Education, 1971 Wis.
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After finding that Krotkoff's contract permitted dismissal due to
Goucher's financial instability, the Fourth Circuit rejected the appellant's
argument that a jury should have determined whether a condition of
financial exigency existed at the college.,3 The Goucher court applied an
accepted standard that dismissals alleged to be due to an institution's
financial instability must directly result from a legitimate condition of
financial exigency.4 4 The Fourth Circuit found that Goucher had satisfied
this requirement, concluding that the college's financial troubles caused
Krotkoff's dismissal.45 The court emphasized that the college's trustees
did not dismiss Krotkoff in bad faith4" and that the trustees reasonably
believed that the college was in an unstable financial condition.47 The
Goucher court refused to review the propriety of the trustees' handling of
the Goucher endowment and ruled that the existence of financial
exigency should be judged by an institution's operating funds instead of
L. REv. 2. Due to current economic conditions and the relative scarcity of available tenured
positions to qualified professionals, a collective bargaining contract represents an attractive
alternative to the traditional status of tenure. See Kirp, Collective Bargaining in Educa-
tion: Professionals as a Political Interest Group, 21 J. PUB. L. 323, 328 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Kirp]; Tenure Rights, supra note 1, at 307. Since the AAUP has begun to pursue
collective bargaining as a means of realizing higher education goals, see Kirp, supra at 324,
recent AAUP promulgations, such as the 1976 Recommended Institutional Regulations, see
note 10 supra, may not represent national norms because a union's bargaining position
often requires demanding greater benefits than the union ultimately expects to receive. The
Status of AAUP Policy, supra note 2, at 8. In NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 48 U.S.L.W. 4175
(1980), the Supreme Court recently denied a private university's faculty union the benefits
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Id. at 4180. The Court sanctioned Yeshiva
University's refusal to bargain with the union, reasoning that full-time Yeshiva faculty
members are managerial employees and thus excluded from the NLRA's coverage. Id. at
4179-80. In determining that the Yeshiva faculty performs managerial duties, the Court's
majority relied on the faculty's absolute authority in academic matters. Id. at 4179. Thus,
depending on a school's particular method of institutional governance, Yeshiva may frus-
trate collective bargaining attempts in private universities.
43 585 F.2d at 681; accord Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, No. 2-57568, slip op. at
10 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1977). The Lumpert court ruled that the issue of whether a state
of financial exigency existed at the University of Dubuque was not a jury question unless
the dismissal of tenured faculty was alleged to be for a reason other than the strained
financial condition of the university. Id. Over a four year period, the University of Dubuque
had approximately a half-million dollar deficit which depleted unrestricted endowments
from $170,000 to $114. Id. at 6.
11 See 585 F.2d at 681; 1940 Statement, supra note 2, at 270. The requirements of
causation and an actual financial crisis as the criteria for a demonstrably bona fide dismissal
were established in AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. at 447, 346 A.2d at 617.
Bloomfield found the dismissal of tenured faculty members to be improper as the college
had not met the burden of proving that the terminations related to a condition of financial
exigency. Id. at 447, 346 A.2d at 618. The determinative fact in Bloomfield seems to be that
the college immediately hired twelve teachers after the thirteen plaintiffs were dismissed.
See 129 N.J. Super. at 269, 322 A.2d at 856; Tucker, supra note 6, at 105-06.
" 585 F.2d at 681.
46 Id. at 681; see text accompanying note 20 supra. See also Karlen v. New York Univ.,
464 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. N.Y. 1979). In Karlen, the court found a cause of action to exist
when the plaintiff alleged that the university's lowering of the mandatory retirement age
was a bad faith response to the school's actual economic condition. Id. at 707-08.
'7 585 F.2d at 681.
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its capital assets.4 8 Since courts typically are reluctant to displace an
institution's financial planning with judicial opinion,49 the Fourth Circuit
correctly concluded that the trustees' disposition of Goucher's capital
assets was not a jury question.
The Goucher court next rejected Krotkoff's contention that a jury
should have considered the reasonableness of the standards used to select
her for dismissal.5 0 Although procedures for the termination of tenure at
Goucher were not set forth in Krotkoff's employment contract,51 the court
accepted the appellant's claim that her contract required fair and
reasonable termination standards.5 2 Nevertheless, acknowledging that the
necessity for revising Goucher's curriculum was undisputed,5 the Fourth
Circuit ruled that the college's termination standards were fair and
reasonable.54 As the college demonstrated a rational justification for the
retention of Ehrlich rather than Krotkoff, 5 the court correctly abstained
from judicial interference with Goucher's academic affairs.5
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Krotkoff's assertion that a jury
should have evaluated the reasonableness of the college's efforts to find
her alternate employment.57 The Goucher court accepted Krotkoff's claim
that the tenure contract required a reasonable effort to find her alternate
employment. 8 Finding no evidence that the college failed to make
reasonable efforts to secure alternate employment for Krotkoff,"5
however, the Fourth Circuit properly denied Krotkoff relief.60
18 Id. at 681; accord Karlen v. New York Univ., 464 F. Supp. at 707. See also note 10
supra.
" See Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, No. 2-57568, slip op. at 10 (Iowa Ct. App.
Apr. 14, 1977); AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. at 446, 346 A.2d at 617 (App.
Div. 1975). The Bloomfield court found that the disposition of a multi-million dollar tract of
land was beyond the scope of judicial review. Id.
:0 585 F.2d at 682.
1 Id.; see note 19 supra.
52 585 F.2d at 682.
53 Id.
54 Id.; see text accompanying note 14 supra. Although they were not challenged, the
termination procedures in Rose v. Elmhurst College, 62 Ill. App. 3d 824, 825-26, 379 N.E.2d
791, 793 (1978), and Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 199 Neb. 618, -, 260 N.W.2d 595, 597
(1977), were substantially similar to those followed in Goucher. See 585 F.2d at 677-78.
:5 See 585 F.2d at 678; note 14 supra.
6 See 585 F.2d at 681. In New York Inst. of Tech. v. State Div. of Hum. Rights, 40
N.Y.2d 316, 322, 353 N.E.2d 598, 602 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals stressed that
the managing officers of a university are best able to perform the special skills needed in the
sensitive areas of faculty appointment, promotion and tenure. Id.; accord Cusumano v.
Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980, 987 (8th Cir. 1974).
' 585 F.2d at 682-83.
"Id. While the 1940 Statement of Principles contains no mandate that a college assist
a dismissed faculty member to secure alternate employment at the same institution, the
AAUP's 1976 Recommended Institutional Regulations, see note 10 supra, require an institu-
tion to make every effort to find the faculty member another suitable position before the
teacher is dismissed. 1976 RIR, supra note 10, at 18. This requirement is consistent with the
purpose of tenure in protecting an unpopular teacher from arbitrary dismissal under the
guise of financial exigency. See Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d at 847.
:9 585 F.2d at 682-83.
0 Goucher's refusal to train Krotkoff in economics, see id. at 678; text accompanying
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